By David J. Dallin
Yale University Press, New Haven
Oxford University Press, London
1956, 422 pp.
Soviet Russia has long been a riddle to the outside world. However, never, since the establishment of the Bolshevist Government on the Russian soil, has it been more enigmatic than in the post-war years, especially after the death of Stalin in 1953. In a short span of three years, many changes have come over the Soviet scene under his heirs. There has been a certain relaxation in Soviet home affairs, economy, relations with the West, and relations with the satellites. Stalin, once its infallible and omnipotent ruler, was downgraded; "personal cult," renounced, and collective leadership" has become the slogan of the new Kremlin masters. All these bewildering changes have puzzled many a foreign observer of Soviet affairs and have been a subject of much heated discussion in the chancelleries of foreign capitals. The most impelling question in everybody's mind is whether these deviations from the policies of the old regime represent the inauguration of a new era or just a temporary tactical retreat to cope with the new developments both at home and abroad.
This is the question which Professor Dallin tries to answer in his new book, "The Changing World of Soviet Russia." A recognized authority on Soviet affairs and author of many books on that country, he has an intimate, comprehensive, and thorough knowledge of Soviet life in its many manifestations, thus eminently qualifying himself for the task he undertakes. In fact, the present book is an expansion of his previous work, "The Real Soviet Russia," which made its first appearance in 1944 and was revised three years later. A number of new sections have been added on the present Russian internal policies and foreign affairs, thereby bringing the events up to date. Well-documented, it is characterized as much by the richness of illustration with facts and figures as by the detached objectivity with which the author evaluates each problem dealt with. His conclusions with respect to the present Soviet domestic and foreign policies, however, do not warrant the optimistic attitudes and high expectations by the Russian sympathizers who are obviously influenced more by the Soviet "new look" propaganda than by their reason. In the preface, Mr. Dallin admits, "as for the basic ideas of the original work, there has been, I regret to say, no reason to negate or retract anything said in 1944-47."
Since Khrushchev's renunciation of Stalin before the 20th Party Congress, much furor has been made of Stalin's crimes and the Stalin myth both inside and outside of the Iron Curtain. The Moscow Communists, who proclaim the Marxist theory that history is made not by individuals but by economic forces and "class" action, now attempt to lay all the blame for Stalinism on Stalin. And their foreign apologists adopt the same line, completely losing sight of the central issue involved in the overthrow of the Stalin myth. The real issue is that the horrors of Stalin's rule were not primarily the result of the aberrations of Stalin or any other individual but are instead inherent elements and inevitable products of the whole Communist system which requires a Stalin to run it and, therefore, must always create a Stalin or collapse in chaos and revolt.
It should be pointed out that throughout the four decades of its existence, the Soviet Government has never abandoned the two main principles which have been at the base of all Soviet policies-universal state economy and exclusive political power, be it under Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov or Khrushchev. "The principle of state economy," said Dallin, "was and remains the highest principle of Soviet policy; it continues to determine not only its economic policy but its policy in all other spheres... The second inviolate principle of Soviet policy is the preservation of all power in the hands of the political group which is determined to make impossible any restoration of individual economy; the preservation of that power by any and all means of internal policy, however ruthless; and the pursuit of a foreign policy which will facilitate the development and expansion of the system of integral state economy." It is true that in the course of the revolutionary development, there were periods of slight political or economic relief, as, for instance, Lenin's New Economic Policy introduced in the early twenties and the pronouncements on democracy during the war of 1941.45. However, they, like a score of similar moves, were made for the attainment of a certain purpose. As soon as the goal was achieved, they were either abolished or forgotten. Dallin concludes: "Throughout all the moves and countermoves, throughout genuine psychological evolution and the faked maneuvers, despite all the zigzags and turns in all possible directions, these two pillars of Sovietism have proved stable and resistant."
A study of Soviet foreign relations' shows similar trends. Zigs follow zags. There have been periods of tension and periods of relaxation in her relations with the outside world. However, "certain basic conceptions persist in Moscow's ideology. Nothing has altered in the Soviet attitude toward capitalism-it remains convinced that capitalism is dying." When resistance by the non-Communist world is successful, Soviet Russia resorts to, as in the thirties and now again, the Trojan horse tactic of temporary "co-existence" and a "united front" with "progressive" elements to capture parliaments and bring Communists to power legally. But the world revolution is always the paramount objective. It would be pursued by violence, terror and war, once anti-Communist resistance weakens. In the course of World War II, for example, cooperation with the West was absolutely necessary to save the "fatherland of Socialism."
She not only fought side by side with such "imperialists" as the United States and Great Britain but did not hesitate to proclaim the policy of "Socialism in one country" in her attempt to appease her war allies. Since the war this policy has been replaced by a new one. "For as Moscow sees it," Dallin explains, "the policy of 'Socialism in one country' was correct during periods of revolutionary defeat, of relative stability of capitalism, but this policy, ‘which brought incalculable advantage' to the cause of Communism, in Stalin's phrase, came to a natural termination in 1930, when the world was plunged into a new holocaust and a new dynamic period of history began."
Thus we can readily see that in spite of the drastic policy changes both in the domestic and foreign fields after the death of Stalin, it should not be construed to mean a change of Soviet fundamental policies which have remained constant even through periods of stress and strain in the four decades of its existence. The fact is that the legacy which his heirs received was beset with problems. A dead end had been reached in home affairs as well as in foreign policies. As on so many other occasions in the course of her revolutionary development, a tactical change was called for. In expressing his conception of diplomacy, Stalin said: "Words must have no relations to actions—otherwise what kind of diplomacy it is? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry waters or wooden iron." Whoever naively believes in the Communists', professions should pause and think over these words.
F. C. YOH
THE MAN WITH THREE FACES
by Hans-Otto Meissner
Rinehart & Co., New York
243 pages, US$3.50
This is the story of Russia's master spy who probably did more to save Moscow and Stalingrad than Zhukov and Chuikov, commanders for the defense of the two cities against the German attacks during World War II. Far be it from me to play up a traitor that turned communist to betray his fatherland. In the belief, however, that there may be thousands of Sorges now at large in all parts of the world, I think that calling attention to the evil work of one may help to expose others like him.
The reader's inevitable reaction to this work of Meissner's would be amazement at the facility with which the Red agents infiltrated a foreign government. He would also be inclined to wonder to what heights Russian espionage must have attained now if it had attained the high degree of perfection it did even before World War II. For Russia's resources have since the end of the war greatly increased and the number of potential traitors in every part of the world ready to betray their our country for the aggrandizement of Soviet Russia are probably ten times what it used to be. In a capital which was known to the world as most difficult for espionage operations, Richard Sorge, posing as correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung and a few other German newspapers, moved around Tokyo with his four chief lieutenants as if they had the freedom of the city. When the dragnet was in, scarce forty persons were implicated. Of these, twenty-three were acquitted and only seventeen stood trial.
And look what this small group did accomplish! Sorge was not boasting when he said to the newspapermen at the time of his trial: "It's all the same to me who wins or loses this war. But no matter who, none in any nation has done what I have done. Think of field marshals and generals brooding over plans of operations and sending out battle orders to their armies. Then think of Richard Sorge, the man who has really decided where the greatest battles of all shall be fought. When ships go down and aircraft fall out of the sky, it is I who have been the instigation of their destruction."
What he had in the back of his mind was undoubtedly that he and his small group did a great deal to influence the course of some of the decisive battles of the war in a manner that prompted General Douglas MacArthur to describe as, "A devastating example of a brilliant success of espionage."
Born in Russia of a German father who worked in the Baku oil fields for the Czar, Richard was of school age before the family had accumulated enough money to return and settle down in Berlin. He joined the German army during the first world war and was wound ed three times. After the war with its inflation, Sorge was impoverished and sadly disillusioned as many of the German young men of his age. He managed, however, to finish his studies at the universities of Kiel and Hamburg with the degree of Doctor of Political Science. He then joined the Hamburg branch of the German Communist Party and worked for the cause of the Kremlin with the zeal he used to fight for the Kaiser.
His zeal for the cause was known to Moscow and before long he was asked by the Com intern, central committee of all foreign Communist parties everywhere, to go to Moscow to receive training as a spy. His training lasted five years. He was then sent first to the United States and then to England to work for the Com intern. Evidently his work was appreciated in Moscow, for upon his return there he was transferred to work for the Fourth Bureau, the Red Army's intelligence division. His first assignment from the Fourth Bureau was field commander of Soviet military spies in the Far East.
Sorge first came to China in 1930 where he organized the China Unit in Shanghai. It will here that he met the American Communist, Agnes Smedley, who did a great deal to help the spy to start in his work. It was also in China that he met two of his most important colleagues for his future operations, a Japanese by the name Ozaki and a German radio operator by the name of Max Klausen who was specially sent by the Fourth Bureau to work under him. Aside from organizing and planting operatives in Nanking, Peiping, Hankow and Canton, Sorge seemed to have done nothing during his three years' stay in China that an operative from any Western country could not do-with his extra-territorial rights and the protection afforded by the International Settlement in Shanghai and all.
It was, however, in his work in Japan that he showed his mettle. With the rapid rise of the anti-Communist Hitler in Germany and with some two million Japanese troops poised on the borders of Manchuria, Stalin was fearful lest he be attacked from one or both directions. For this reason, the Fourth Bureau transferred Sorge to Tokyo to keep an eye on developments from that direction. Before he could go to the Japanese capital, Sorge had to have a cover occupation. Armed with letters of introduction from Germans abroad, he went back to Germany to join the Nazi Party. For once the all-efficient Gestapo fell down on its job and failed to uncover his former connections with the Hamburg branch of the Communist Party. He soon wangled a job from the importent Germany newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung and three medium-sized papers as their Tokyo correspondent. This gave him prestige and good standing in Tokyo. To help him in his work, Moscow sent one Branko de Voukelitch, a former officer in the Yugoslav Army, who went to Tokyo with the cover occupation as correspondent of the French magazine, La Vue. The fifth member of the team, a Japanese by the name of Miyagi Yotoko, who had joined the American Communist Party at Los Angeles, was sent by Fourth Bureau from there to help Sorge in Tokyo. Sorge soon wormed his way into the German Embassy in Tokyo and got along famously with the German Ambassador, von Dirksen, and the Military Attache, Colonel Ott, who later took von Dirksen's place as ambassador.
Meanwhile his Japanese assistant Ozaki became chief secretary of Konoye's cabinet, and Voukelitch moved around the French, British and American embassies freely. With such a setup, Sorge was able to report the so-called "February Incident" of 1939, in which a group of hotheaded young Japanese militarists staged an abortive rebellion against the government, before it took place. By swapping information with the embassies, the Sorge Unit enjoyed immense prestige among the diplomatic corps, and the Germany ambassador and military attache depended on him for much of the information they supplied Berlin.
Sorge's next scoop was to report the Japanese invasion of China long before it happened. His report read: "JAPANESE INVASION CHINA BE DECLARED AT UNSPECIFIED DATE AT LATEST FEW DAYS AT SOONEST SEVERAL HOURS STOP JAPAN NOT REPEAT NOT PLANNING ASSAULT ON SOVIET AT THIS TIME." This was before the Japanese assault on the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping on July 7, 1937.
Then six weeks before the Germans launched their attacks on Russia, he radioed the following message to Moscow: "ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY DIVISIONS MASSED ON SOVIET BORDER WILL ATTACK ALONG WHOLE FRONTIER JUNE TWENTIETH STOP MAIN DIRECTION OF DRIVE MOSCOW FURTHER DETAILS FOLLOWING" He was only two days off.
His greatest triumph and also the greatest service he rendered his Russian masters was his report in November, 1941, that the Japanese cabinet approved a plan to drive southward with in three weeks and had resisted German pressure to launch a pincer attack on Russia from Siberia. This news enabled Stalin to move two million of his trained Siberian reserves to the Western front just in time to save Moscow; and with Moscow, Stalingrad and the rest of Russia.
His last message was a warning about the Japanese impending attack on Pearl Harbor. On October 15, 1940, he sent out this following message: "JAPANESE CARRIER AIR FORCE ATTACKING UNITED STATES NAVY AT PEARL HARBOR PROBABLY DAWN NOVEMBER SIX STOP SOURCE RELIABLE." However, as the message never seemed to have been received by Stalin, it might have been fictitiously claimed by Sorge for what it was worth.
Meanwhile things were moving fast on Sorge, and soon he and his gang were rounded up. In the ensuing trial he and Ozaki were sentenced to death and executed. The rest of his gang were given long prison terms. Of the big five of the Unit, only Max Klausen, the radio operator, lived to see the end of the war.
The author speculates that Sorge may be still living as a result of a possible arrangement for the exchange of prisoners made by Stalin as a token of his gratitude to Sorge. While this might be a possibility, it was not something to be expected from a man like Stalin. After his arrest and exposure, Sorge could no longer be of any use to Russia, and it would be very un-Stalin-like for him to take any trouble to secure Sorge's release from the Japanese hands.
EDWARD' Y. K. KWONG